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Joris Schapendonk is a PhD candidate at the department of Human Geography, Radboud 
University Nijmegen The Netherlands. His research project focuses on the non-linear character of 
sub-Saharan African migration and he discusses the subject in the framework of the migration 
and development debate. He investigates the immobility of particular groups of sub-Saharan 
African (transit) migrants on their way to Europe and the extreme mobility of sub-Saharan 
African migrants in Europe. This is done in order to understand what mobility, as an integral part 
of human life, means for traditional notions of development.  
 
Abstract 
This empirical study analyzes the migration process of sub-Saharan Africans heading for Europe 
in the framework of the theoretical concept of transit migration. It focuses on the organization and 
facilitation of migration and the sharing of information among migrants in their process of 
migrating. The study aims to get more insights into the dynamics of transit migration and 
migrants’ (in)dependencies and (im)mobilities during their journey. In contrast to other in-depth 
studies on sub-Saharan African transit migration, this analysis includes the migration process 
after the migrant’s arrival in Europe. It has a broader geographical perspective since it is based on 
fieldwork in Senegal, Morocco and Spain. 
 The study shows that the social networks of migrants are often not sufficient to fulfill 
their migration process; most transit migrants need (professional) assistance for specific parts of 
the journey. Moreover, migrants form collectives to create some protection ‘en route’. However, 
despite these and other dependencies and constraints, transit migrants are, in essence, highly 
flexible in achieving their goals and changing their plans. Their migration process reflects often a 
‘spontaneous’ character and consists of repeated moves and temporal, both voluntary and 
involuntary, settlements. When seen from this perspective, the migration process can be 
understood in terms of mobility with its dynamics and constraints, instead of a single and linear 





One longstanding misconception regarding migration is that it is generally seen as  a simple move 
from an origin to a destination (Skeldon 1997). Migration, however, is often much more dynamic 
in reality. This becomes particularly clear when migration from sub-Saharan Africa towards 
Europe is taken into account. A considerable number of migrants from this region lacks financial 
means and appropriate travel documents to reach Europe directly from their countries of origin. 
Furthermore, the EU’s restrictive migration policies ‘block’ the direct pathways to the North. For 
these reasons, many sub-Saharan African migrants must cross several countries to reach the 
borders of Europe; this journey takes months or years instead of several days or weeks. The 
entering of a state in order to travel on to another is mainly conceptualized as transit migration 
(Baldwin-Edwards 2006; de Haas 2006; Papadopoulou 2005; Düvell 2006). 
With the emergence of transit migration there seems to be growing academic interest in 
the migration process of people (the act of migrating). Traditionally, this act was more or less 
neglected in migration research. The main focus in social science was on the two ending sides of 
migration; the decision making process before migrating at the beginning stage and the impact of 
migration on host (and sending) societies at the ending side of migration (International Migration 
Institute 2006). This has changed slightly in the framework of transit migration since some 
researchers have examined the overland migration process and the ‘transit phase’ of sub-Saharan 
African migrants with an in-depth approach. Examples are; Hamood (2006) in the case of sub-
Saharan African migration through Libya, Collyer (2006) in the case of undocumented African 
migrants in Morocco and Brachet (2005) in the case of trans-Saharan migration through Niger 
and Algeria. These studies provide valuable insights into migration methods and the experiences 
of migrants in temporary host countries. However, they generally have a limited geographical 
scope; they describe a particular step of the journey and the analyses end just outside Europe. 
Moreover, although the studies provide in-depth insights into the migration process, they do not 
analyze the organization and facilitation of the migration process extensively.1  
This empirical study analyzes the migration process by using a broader approach. Firstly, 
the analysis has a broader geographical perspective than the studies mentioned above. It is based 
on fieldwork in three different countries; Spain, Morocco and Senegal.2 Therefore, this analysis 
of the migration process does not end at the fringes of Europe. Secondly, unlike the other studies, 
this research focuses on the ‘working’ of the migration process rather than on the experiences of 
migrants during the process. Thereby, the central objective of this study is to analyze the 
migration process by focusing on migration networks, migration facilitators and the sharing of 
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information among migrants in order to gain insights into the dynamics of transit migration and 
migrants’ (in)dependencies and (im)mobilities during their process of migrating.  
The findings are based on semi-structured interviews, non-structured interviews and 
social talks with sub-Saharan African migrants. In addition, academic experts, NGO 
representatives and professionals working with migrants have been interviewed in order to 
understand the broader context of the situation in the three countries. The fieldwork has been 
conducted in these particular countries since they have specific characteristics with respect to 
sub-Saharan African migration. Senegal is primarily viewed as an important sending country, 
Morocco primarily as a transit country and Spain is considered most importantly as a destination 
country. However, it should be mentioned that these categorizations are much more blurred in 
reality; all three countries are, to some extent, sending, transit and receiving countries at the same 
time. Finally, it is important to note that it is impossible to outline the migration process of all 
sub-Saharan African migrants. The group of migrants heading for Europe is too heterogeneous; 
the causes and aims of their migration projects differ as well as their personal characteristics, their 
regions of origin, migration routes and migration means. This study attempts therefore to give 
merely some insights into the migration process of sub-Saharan Africans traveling through West 
and North Africa in order to reach Europe. It is not intended to outline the migration process of 
African migrants in general. 
  
Before starting the analysis, the concept of transit migration and its difficulties is briefly outlined 
below in order to provide a better understanding of the theoretical implications of the concept. 
 
Transit migration: Some difficulties of the concept 
Transit migration emerged as a concept in the beginning of the 1990s and referred mainly to 
migration from Eastern to Western Europe. After the fall of the Iron Curtain, many Eastern 
Europeans tried to reach the wealthier parts of the continent. Because of the ‘illegal’ character of 
this migration, the concept is often used as an equivalent for irregular migration. It is mainly for 
this reason that the concept is highly politicized (Düvell 2006) since it is primarily perceived as a 
European threat (Baldwin-Edwards 2006). It is often written that ‘masses of people’ or ‘hundred 
thousands of migrants’ are waiting at the Eastern as well as the Southern border zones of Europe 
in order to enter the continent ‘illegally’. However, these estimations are based on questionable 
methods such as multiplier applications. In addition, many of these transit migrants aim to enter 
Europe while it is never certain, at least not a priori, whether they actually manage to do so 
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(Düvell 2006; de Haas 2006). Consequently, the number of transit migrants towards Europe is 
extremely difficult to count. 
The fact that transit migration is stated as a ‘threat just outside the border’ also assumes 
that this phenomenon exists only from areas outside Europe towards this political entity. This will 
be disproved by the analysis below. The illegal character of transit migration is another aspect 
that has to be nuanced. Although it is obvious that a considerable number of migrants are 
attempting to enter Europe illegally from transit areas, it is wrong to label all transit migration as 
‘illegal’. It consists of a wide range of categories of migrants, including both regular and irregular 
migrants, as well as political refugees and asylum seekers (Nyberg Sørensen 2006).  
Finally, by explaining the politication of transit migration, a reflecting note on the 
Eurocentric approach is necessary. In the context of South-North migration there is a widespread 
misconception that all sub-Saharan African migrants migrating northwards are heading for 
Europe. This is highly inaccurate since intra-regional migration between sub-Saharan African and 
North African countries has been common for centuries and for many sub-Saharan African 
migrants North African countries are their desired destination, particularly Libya. Others are 
attempting, but not managing to enter Europe and they decide to settle in perceived transit areas 
as a second best option (de Haas 2006, 2007; Carling 2007; Düvell 2006). In fact, South-South 
migration transcends South-North migration in volume and significance. For these reasons, 
migration related policies in the South, if existent, focuses more on intra-regional migration than 
on migration dynamics towards Europe (Zoomers and van Naerssen 2006). 
 
Not only is transit migration a politicized concept, but there are also epistemological, 
methodological and empirical difficulties related to it. Düvell (2006), for instance, stresses the 
issue of drawing the dividing line between transit migration and repeated or multiple migration. 
According to him, many authors inaccurately interpret migrants who move on to another country 
as ‘transit’ even after a long stay in their host country. This contradicts several evidence-based 
migration theories: cumulative causation, culture of migration. These studies prove that “once 
someone migrates, the more he or she is likely to continue migrating” (Düvell 2006).  
 Another interesting methodological difficulty outlined by Düvell is the difference 
between actual transit migration and mental transit migration. As stated above, not all migrants 
who intend to go to Europe actually reach Europe. For this reason, often used interview methods 
in (transit) migration related research cannot automatically be taken for granted since this method 
implies an a priori presumption that these people are actually transiting to Europe. At the same 
time a post hoc research design (interviewing former transit migrants in the destination country) 
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for investigating transit migration brings in other methodological concerns, because then the 
actual state of being in transit is not investigated, but the migrant’s reconstruction of the transit 
period (Düvell 2006).   
 
As a result, there is a growing consensus that transit migration should not be understood as a 
status or as a specific type of migration. Instead, transit migration introduces a continuum in the 
migration process. Thereby, the concept does not imply a continuous process of moving, it shows 
that migration has often a step-wise character of moving and staying (Papadopoulou 2005; de 
Haas 2007; Düvell 2006).  
 
1. The migration process in Africa: migration networks, collectives and information 
sharing 
West Africa has a very long tradition of migration. It has often been noted that migration should 
be seen as a way of life in this region because nomadism and state-overarching communities are 
embedded in daily life. Moreover, the ECOWAS protocol on the Free Movement of Persons, the 
Right of Residence and Establishment, makes international migration between (most of) the West 
African countries legal. Citizens from ECOWAS countries can travel without a visa between the 
member states and reside in them for 90 days. The protocol also allows people to apply for a 
permanent resident paper, when these 90 days have expired (de Haas 2006; Adepoju 2002). 
 
Hybrid networks 
One of the consequences resulting from the migration tradition is the existence of well-developed 
migration related services. Often local transport businesses carry migrants along ancient trade 
routes. Furthermore, other migration related businesses, such as money transfer agencies and 
communication centers, have emerged along migration routes (Lahlou 2007). Another 
consequence stemming from the migration culture is that the transportation and/or ‘smuggling’ of 
migrants within states and across African state-borders, is, in general, viewed as a normal and 
informal economic activity rather than an illegal act (Interview 2007). A clear exception is the 
trafficking of women and children in and from the region. In West Africa, and particularly in 
Sahelian countries, it is not uncommon to send family members away to look for work in other 
places. Nevertheless, the authorities are (more and more) viewing the arrangement and 
recruitment mechanisms for this type of migration as a serious form of crime (Ndione and 
Broekhuis 2006; Adepoju 2005). This issue is later further outlined.  
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Reliable contacts and information are extremely important in the migration process. For this 
reason, migration networks consist primarily of social contacts linked to each other by migrants 
themselves; the social network. Most of the time, these social networks are no longer sufficient 
for people to migrate, because migrants do not have contacts in all of the ‘migration hubs’3 
(Interview 2007). Moreover, migrants need assistance for specific parts of their journey. For 
instance, the crossing of the Sahara or false travel documents cannot be arranged without the help 
of a third person. As a Congolese migrant in Rabat stated: 
 
“They cannot cross the Sahara bare-footed. So they need other persons to arrange the journey.”  
 
A Togolese migrant indicated that his social network was not sufficient to fulfill his migration 
process and therefore he needed assistance: 
 
”I didn’t know anybody in Tamanrasset [Algeria]. So I first went looking for a ‘guide’ who could 
help me to get in contact with the right persons.” 
 
Since this group of migrants needs (professional) assistance for some parts of their journeys, 
migration networks are, in this context, best described as hybrid networks consisting of migrants’ 
personal contacts and ‘in-between-persons’ who facilitate migration processes. Contrary to many 
policymakers’ beliefs, the majority of recent academic research on transit migration emphasizes 
the informal and often local character of the migration related services. For instance, Collyer 
writes the following regarding transit migrants in Morocco:  
 
“All the migrants who were interviewed reported paying for assistance on certain legs of the 
journey. Without exception, this assistance was small in scale and local in nature and did not 




In the framework of sub-Saharan African migration to Italy via Libya, Hamood writes: 
 
“Respondents describe a system in which individuals or small groups of individuals cooperate for 
mutual financial interest.” 
… 
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“For the most part…, it seems that there is little, if any, coordination between the smugglers at 
different parts of the journey to Italy (through the desert, within Libya, across the sea).”  
(Hamood 2006) 
 
De Haas concludes in the framework of West African migration: 
 
“Smugglers are usually not part of international organized crime, but tend to be locally based and 
operate alone or in relatively small, flexible networks. Migrants travel in stages and typically pay 
smugglers for one difficult leg of the journey.” 
(de Haas 2007) 
 
Thus, the assistance offered to migrants during their migration process in Africa does, in general, 
not reflect the Western notion of large-scale, well-organized and criminal networks. The networks 
are much more diffuse and the assistance is often embedded in normal economic activities. 
 In addition, the act of ‘smuggling’ is not always perceived as a crime; it is sometimes 
formulated as a ‘crime without a victim’ meaning that it is an act of assistance the migrant has 
asked for. It differs from trafficking in the fundamental sense that smuggling does not imply 
forms of exploitation (van Liempt and Doomernik 2006). Consequently, there are different 
perceptions of human smuggling; policy makers may approach smuggling as serious forms of 
illegal acts, whereas at the same time migrants may view the same activities as necessary and 
helpful forms of assistance. This is in line with the conclusions drawn in Van Liempt’s study on 
human smuggling. Her study shows that “the boundaries of helpers and smugglers are fluid, and 
that there is no such thing as the prototypical smuggler” (van Liempt 2007). She also concludes 
that migrants are not passive victims in the smuggling process; usually they do have agency. To 
indicate this, she distinguishes the following three types of interaction between the migrant and 
the smuggler that can also function in combination: 
1) The service type: Migrants have a fixed destination and smugglers bring them there. 
2) The directive type: Migrants are going where the smugglers take them; some migrants 
have no preferences on where to go, some are overruled by their smugglers and are 
therefore not going where they intended to go and some migrants are mislead by their 
smugglers and end up in a different place than they had intended to.  
3) The negotiable type: Smugglers offer migrants several opportunities with different prices 
and migrants are in the position to choose the best option. They can measure the costs 
and benefits of the risks involved.  
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(van Liempt 2007). 
 
The local and ‘non-criminal’ character of migration assistance, as outlined above, has also been 
confirmed by an interview held with the Head of Mission of the UNHCR in Rabat, as he 
described most services as ‘a friendly helping hand’. However, he appropriately stated that this 
does not automatically mean that criminal networks and human trafficking networks are non-
existent in the migration scene (Interview 2007).  
 
Migration as organized crime 
Although the above section emphasizes the small-scale character of migration related activities, it 
is also noticed that the organization of the migration processes is becoming more professional. 
Due to several difficulties during the journey and the increased restrictive EU migration policies, 
a considerable number of migrants is more and more dependent on well-structured and 
coordinated migration networks. Therefore, the growing concern about the involvement of 
organized criminal networks in the sub-Saharan African migration scene seems to be justified. As 
Baldwin-Edwards outlines, “organized crime has greatly benefited from European restrictions on 
immigration, originally by merely facilitating the illegal entry of immigrants as a short-term 
commercial arrangement” (Baldwin-Edwards 2002). A recent publication of the UNODC focuses 
on the issue of criminal migration networks (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2006). 
This document pays special attention to the so-called ‘full packet operators’, who plan and 
coordinate most or all aspects of the journey. Often Nigerian groups are associated with these acts 
of violation.  
Moreover, the increased presence of irregular Asian transit migrants in West and North 
Africa heading for Europe indicates that there are international smuggling networks involved. 
According to Interpol, Africa is becoming more and more a transit area for Asian migrants, 
particularly from China. Much of this migration seems to be connected to South Asian criminal 
networks (http://www.interpol.int/Public/THB/PeopleSmuggling/Default.asp, 22-4-2006). There 
is one example of 57 Pakistani with legal (not fake) business visas. They turned out to be young 
men (16-18 years old) from rural areas with no business experience at all, and they stated that 
they had been recruited in their hometowns (Interview 2007). According to a representative of the 
International Office for Migration (IOM) in Dakar, these kinds of activities, and there are 
numerous examples,4 prove the well-organized and sometimes global structure of the smuggling 




When criminal involvements in the migration scene are discussed, the issue of human trafficking 
needs to be further outlined. Adepoju (2005) describes the gradual increase in trafficking of 
humans to and from Africa, as well as within the continent which includes the trafficking of 
children mainly within the West African region. This region is an important “transit zone” for 
trafficked women to Europe. Ghana, for instance, is a transit route for Nigerian women trafficked 
to Italy and Germany. Another example is Mali serving as a transit country for trafficking people 
to France. Although trafficking is generally associated with illegal migration to Europe, the Gulf 
states and South Africa are also mentioned as being important destination countries for trafficked 
persons (Adepoju 2005).  
For the West African region, all ECOWAS members agreed on a declaration to combat 
the trafficking of people in 2001. Since then governmental bodies have designed laws and 
policies relating to this matter. Mali was the first country which adopted a ‘National Plan to Fight 
against Child Trafficking’ (Ndione and Broekhuis 2006). The National Assembly of Senegal 
approved recently (March 2005) a comprehensive draft of an anti-trafficking bill. This bill 
complements the full-range of protection services for victims of human trafficking that the 
government has been providing since 2003. In Nigeria, a National Agency for the Prohibition of 
Traffic in Persons and other Related Matters (NAPTIP) has been established to implement the 
anti-trafficking law of 2003 (de Haas 2006). The anti-trafficking law in Burkina Faso has been 
active since 2004 and the government has also signed bilateral agreements on anti-trafficking 
with Ivory Coast and Mali (Ndione and Broekhuis 2006).  
  
During our fieldwork, the growing complexity of distinguishing between the informal, local 
activities related to migration from well-organized illegal activities was particularly striking. 
Often “big businessmen” are using local actors for their smuggling activities. In Saint Louis 
(Senegal) for instance, there are several “barons” active in arranging journeys to the Canary 
Islands. Based on interviews with local inhabitants, IOM representatives and NGO members, we 
can say that these barons earn huge sums of money with their “dubious businesses”, without 
risking the voyage themselves. They buy boats from local fishermen and make them (the 
fishermen) their captains for a set sea-crossing. In this way the activities of the local actors 
become more embedded in larger organized (and illegal) activities. 
 
Our empirical findings lead us to think that many transit migrants neither rely only on non-
criminal and small scale operating actors, nor do they rely only on large scale criminal networks. 
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They frequently use the migration means and parts of networks which fit best with the particular 
step of their journey. As one migrant stated: “Sometimes they need the help of a smuggler to 
cross a border and sometimes they just take a regular bus to get from A to B” (Interview 2007). 
Therefore, it is inappropriate to presume that (most) transit migrants are victims of large criminal 
smuggling networks. On the other hand, it is also naive to think that all migration related 
activities have a non-criminal, local and uncoordinated character.  
 
The migration facilitators in Africa 
Because transit migrants use hybrid networks to migrate, this section attempts to describe the 
different actors within these networks. Four actors are distinguished: transporters, navigators, 
recruiters and the migrant him- or herself. 
 
The role of the transporters is one in which they bring migrants from one place to another. In the 
case of maritime routes (for instance Senegal-Canary Islands), the transporter or ‘captain’ is often 
a migrant as well. When the shore of the Canary Islands has been reached, he joins the other 
migrants and leaves the pirogue and the equipment - motors, GPS systems, etc. - behind 
(Interview 2007, see also Carling 2007). This means that for almost every sea-crossing a new 
boat must be built. It is therefore not surprising that the ‘pirogue’ producing industry in Saint 
Louis is booming. The ‘captain’ often does not pay for his journey; instead he is obliged to buy 
food for the people on board. The number of people on board usually varies from between 50 and 
100 (Kohnert 2007). It is widely known that the maritime journey can be lengthy. A Senegalese 
migrant in Granada reported that the sea crossing from Dakar to Tenerife took at least eight days 
(Interview 2007). It is also well-known that the sea crossing is risky and that many lives are lost 
along the way. According to the BBC, approximately 6000 African migrants have died or have 
gone missing in 2006 while attempting to reach the Canary Islands (BBC, news message from 28-
12-2006). 
Transporting migrants over land is often a structural economic activity, executed by third 
persons (non-migrants). In ‘migration hubs’, several migration related transport businesses have 
emerged. In most cases, four-wheel drive vehicles are used to transport groups of migrants (25-40 
people) through the Sahara desert. Regarding the desert crossing to Libya, the use of lorries is 
also mentioned, carrying between 150 to 300 people through the same desert (Hamood 2006). 
Furthermore, one respondent mentioned that sometimes this “most difficult step” of the migration 
process is made with the help of camel convoys (Interview 2007).  
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Before departure, migrants have to wait for days, weeks or even months in the migration hubs. 
The length of the waiting period depends, among other things, on migrants’ financial resources 
and the number of other clients for the available transport companies. During this period they are 
generally accommodated in one of the city’s ghettos.5 This is often an extra source of income for 
the transporter, since they also often rent rooms to migrants (Brachet 2005). 
 
In addition to the transporters, navigators are also of vital importance in the migration process. 
These actors mainly plan and coordinate the migration process and are based in Europe, the home 
country or in places en route in Africa (Oumar BA 2007). We found an example of a religious 
organization in Morocco which coordinates the migration process for individual migrants and 
groups of migrants. One of the people involved in the organization had the following to say about 
their activities: 
 
“I often receive emails from people who want to migrate from my country and I try to help them 
to get in contact with the right persons…Like today we [he and his assistant] received an email 
that a truck of 30 people is stuck in the middle of the desert … we are trying to help these people 
with the contacts we have…Sometimes we even go and look for these people by ourselves…We 
arrange the contact between the migrants and their ‘helpers’.” 
 
During this interview their activities appear to be more a friendly helping hand than that they 
represent a strict organized (criminal) group. The assistance they provide was based on solidarity 
and economic profit seemed to be unimportant. In this respect, it is also stated that migration 
navigators are sometimes family members or friends with experience in migration and/or with 
necessary contacts in the places en route (Interview 2007, see also Oumar BA 2007). 
 
The third type of actor is the recruiter. These actors are actively looking for migrants to join a 
particular step of the journey (Oumar BA 2007). We found an example in Saint Louis (Senegal) 
of a person that was recruiting migrants among the Senegalese population and transit migrants 
from other African countries. He was ‘managing’ the journey of five pirogues under the 
supervision of the ‘grand-mariner’, who functions in this case as the migration navigator. Other 
researchers give similar examples (Kohnert 2007; Oumar BA 2007). 
The activities of the migration recruiters can be an autonomous economic activity or they 
can be embedded in broader economic activities. For instance, Brachet (2005) mentions the role 
of so-called coaxers acting around the checkpoint of the Agadez city. These bus-boys follow 
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migrants and take them to the transport agencies after they have paid their entry tax. These 
coaxers do not focus only on migrants, but try to find any kind of passenger.    
 
The main objective of the navigators and recruiters is to arrange contacts between migrants and 
their transporters/smugglers. But migrants can turn into important migration facilitators as well. 
Firstly for themselves, since migrants have to look for the right people for continuing their 
journey. Secondly, some migrants can become important facilitating actors for fellow migrants. 
Based on interviews with migrants and representatives of local NGOs in Morocco, we can say 
that migrants who have already reached Morocco often go back to the border area to “guide” 
migrants through the Algerian-Moroccan border (see also Collyer 2006). In this way, they earn 
some money. Another example of a migrant, who is a facilitating actor for others as well, is the 
captain of the pirogues which embark for the Canary Islands. 
 
Thus, migration processes of sub-Saharan African transit migrants are partly facilitated by ‘third 
persons’. To categorize these people as smugglers is too simplistic since different actors with 
different roles in the migration process can be distinguished.  
 
Migration collectives and the sharing of information 
Often transit migrants create their own migration collectives during their journey. Brachet (2005) 
characterizes these collectives as “a specific form of territoriality…based on a acute sense of 
distance (otherness/exteriority) vis-à-vis the environment they cross”. These collectives are 
usually formed for a certain phase of the migration process in order to finance that particular step 
(e.g. the crossing of the Sahara) or as a form of protection against a hostile social environment 
(Interview 2007; Brachet 2005). As one respondent explained: 
 
“People are always traveling in groups. The group varies from 15 to 20 people sometimes 30. It is 
much safer that way…Individuals are much easier victims of cheats and police violence.” 
 
Collyer (2006) also outlines the protective role of the migrant collectives as he describes them as 
important survival strategies for migrants reducing risk of individuals and creating mutual 
solidarity among migrants. Based on several interviews we can say that solidarity is widely 
shared within the collectives; migrants keep each other updated on security issues, transport 
opportunities and the availability of jobs. However, mostly the solidarity within migration 
collectives is not everlasting. There is one important aspect of the migration process among 
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which great secrecy and even competition exists, namely information about a possibility to make 
the ‘final jump’ to Europe. According to local humanitarian organizations in Morocco, migrants 
are very reluctant to share information on this issue, fearing the competition of other migrants. 
The greater the numbers of people knowing about an opportunity to go to Europe, the less chance 
you have to make use of that opportunity since fellow migrants may “take your place.” Therefore, 
many migrants arrange their ‘final jump’ without informing their fellow migrants, as one NGO 
representative described: 
 
“People go out at night to seek for opportunities to go to Europe. They do not tell their friends, 
and one day they have just disappeared.”    
  
This section indicates that migrant collectives have a short term character in order to overcome a 
particular step of the journey. However, our findings also show that some collectives are more 
long lasting. Sometimes, groups of people decide to start migrating together from the very 
beginning. In Oujda (Morocco), for instance, we spoke to a Ghanaian migrant traveling with a 
group of eight friends from his home town. He organized all different steps of the journey 
together with his friends (sadly enough two of his friends died during the crossing of the desert). 
In Spain, we also found an example of a ‘Piso Patera’6, a migration collective formed on board of 
the patera (pateras are the ‘famous’ small boats migrants are carried with to the European shores. 
In Francophone context these boats are called pirogues), which remains active even after arrival 
in Spain. Nowadays, this Piso Patera, a group of around 15 persons with different nationalities, 
provides information and support in relation to work and proper housing (Interview 2007).  
 Another example of more long lasting migrant collectives is the forming of groups by 
migrants during their ‘waiting period’ in Morocco. To provide more insights into the dynamics of 
these collectives, the case of migrant groups in Oujda is outlined below.  
 
Security, information and migrants’ organization structure: The case of Oujda 
In 2002 an estimated 10,000 undocumented sub-Saharan Africans were living in Morocco and 
according to Collyer, this has not changed significantly in recent years (Collyer 2006). Lahlou 
(2007) estimates this number to be lower between 5,000 and 6,000 individuals (estimation of 
September 2006). Although not all sub-Saharan African migrants living in Morocco are actually 
transiting to Europe, the far majority of the migrants living in informal settlements are, at least, 
aiming to do so. A non-representative survey among sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco 
indicates that 88.7% of the migrants is heading for Europe (Lahlou 2007), at least in their heads. 
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Oujda is a city in East Morocco close to the Algerian border. For sub-Saharan African migrants it 
is one of the main entry points of the country and researchers visit it regularly to carry out transit 
migration related research. A considerable number of sub-Saharan African and some Asian 
migrants are ‘waiting’ here for the chance to go to Europe. Because of the dramatically 
intensified Spanish border control (around Ceuta and Melilla and the Andalusian coasts) many 
migrants heading for Europe ‘get stuck’ in this place. Some are even waiting for years and still 
want to make the final jump, others decide to settle, a far minority returns home (Collyer 2006). 
Many migrants in Oujda live at the university campus, a traditional no-go area for the police 
(because of traditional student protests), and in the so-called tranquillos. The latter are small-scale 
and often mobile communities in the forests of Oujda and in the border area with Algeria 
(Interview 2007). 
As a response to the difficult living conditions and the lack of institutional protection, 
migrant communities are extremely well-organized. This is best explained by the example of the 
campus of the university in Oujda, where approximately 300 migrants are living. The campus 
ground is divided in an Anglophone and Francophone part. Within this lingual division, migrants 
are living in small communities (8-15 persons) based on nationality and ethnicity. Every 
community has its own chairman, often a person with experience in migration or someone who 
had a high function in the home country. The community chairmen are directed by a national 
chairman, and the different national chairmen are controlled by the grand chairman of the 
campus. With the help of this hierarchical structure information is shared, conflicts are solved and 
individuals protected. However, people do not always benefit from this structure. It sometimes 
creates power conflicts and facilitates forms of patronage, abuse and corruption (Interview 2007).  
There are also examples of well-organized gangs in the region around Oujda, mainly in 
the border area, robbing and abusing of newly arrived migrants. A representative of a local 
organization mentioned kidnappings and forms of sexual exploitation of African women within 
the migrant communities. Furthermore, he stated that:  
 
“Newly arrived migrants are victims of bad information. They don’t know how to cross the 
border, so people are making misuse of that. Sometimes, they have to pay twice the price of a 
normal border crossing.”  
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Thus, on the one hand the organization of migrant communities is a form of protection in which 
information is shared. On the other hand, these structures undermine the safety of specific 
migrants, mainly women and newly arrived migrants (Interview 2007).  
 
 
Migrants’ places and the placing of migrants 
The informal camps in and around Oujda are no exception. As showed in figure 1, similar camps 
are to be found in South Algeria, near the Spanish enclaves in Morocco and around the city 
Laayoune in the Western Sahara (CIMADE 2004). Although the information of figure 1 could be 
out of date already, because migration routes and migrants’ camps change rapidly, migrants tend 
to come and go to the same places (Interview 2007). Apart from the informal camps, settlements 
around Rabat, Tangier and Casablanca are also important places to live in for transit migrants. 
Besides being in Morocco, migrants are also ‘waiting’ in, among others, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia 
Mauritania, Senegal and Cape Verde (Carling 2007; Hamood 2006). 
In addition to these informal settlements there are also migrant settlements set up by the 
authorities in which migrants are, after being apprehended, ‘placed’ (van Houtum and van 
Naerssen 2002). This confinements of unwanted migrants in closed camps, in and outside Europe, 
has turned into a permanent form of Agemben’s ‘state of exception’ in which non-citizens are 
subject to extrajudicial acts of the state, preferably in extra-territorial spaces (Agamben 2005; 
Goldschmidt 2006). In this way a particular group of migrants is immobilized in its purest sense 
and are put, in the words of Zygmunth Bauman, in “nowhere places” as “human waste” (Bauman 
2004).  
 
‘En route’ communication in Africa 
During their migration process, many migrants use modern communication means. Without 
exception, every migrant we have spoken to (in Senegal, Morocco and Spain) had a mobile 
phone, with which they stayed in contact with fellow migrants and family back home. In case of 
apprehension, the mobile phone is the first asset that is taken from the migrant (Interview 2007). 
Perhaps, this symbolizes at best the importance of the phone in the migration process; it is ‘the 
way’ to get in contact with people in the migration network.   
A respondent in Dakar explained that the mobile phone also functions as a form of 
(financial) capital. After we noted he had a different, a less luxurious, phone than the last time we 
met him, he said: 
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“Yesterday, I changed it, I know this thing is useless [laughed]…but I had to change it, because I 
had to pay the rent of my room, so I changed my phone for a cheaper one.”  
 
Migrants also frequently use the internet to keep in contact with their family and to facilitate the 
migration project: bus tickets are bought, transporters are contacted etc. (Interview 2007). 
Furthermore, money transfer agencies have also become important factors in the migration 
process. Their presence in many places en route enables migrants to receive money from their 
families to continue their journey. The need for migrants to communicate and receive money 
partly explains the emergence of ‘transit communication economies’ in the migration hubs 
(Lahlou 2007; van Moppes and Schapendonk 2007).  
  
2. The migration process within Europe 
This section outlines the migration process of sub-Saharan African migrants in Europe 
emphasizing that migration processes do not automatically end when the continent is reached. For 
many sub-Saharan African migrants Spain is currently one of the most popular (at least temporal) 
destination countries. Jobs are highly available since the agriculture and construction sectors are 
booming. Furthermore, the informal character of the Spanish society, compared to the more 
regulated Northern European countries, is assumed to be more attractive (Arango and 
Jachimowicz 2005). 
Besides that the findings are based on interviews with sub-Saharan African migrants in 
Spain, Spanish organizations active in the reception of migrants (governmental and non-
governmental organizations), migrant organizations and human right organizations were also 
important sources for information in this section. 
 
Migration insertion phase: Entering Spain 
The arrival of exhausted African migrants at the shores of the Canary Islands is widely presented 
by different media. Although, there are many other ways to arrive in Spain (the majority of 
irregular migrants enter Spain regularly on a basis of visas and become ‘visa-overstayers’ 
(Barrero 2006)), the migration process after irregular entry by boat is outlined. It is stated that 
migrants that have entered Spain via the enclaves Ceuta and Melilla have a similar ‘insertion 
phase’ (Interview 2007). Therefore the following section provides useful insights into the 
migration process of sub-Saharan transit migrants towards Spain and the continuation of the 
migration process after arrival in that country. 
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At the very first stage of arrival, medical staff members of the Spanish Red Cross provide the first 
humanitarian assistance to the migrants in the main points of entry at the islands. Afterwards, the 
police or the Guardia Civil accompanies the migrants to the so-called Centro Internamento de 
Extranjeros (CIE); migrant detention centers.  
In the CIEs different staff members of the Red Cross (medical staff, social workers and lawyers) 
take care of the physical, mental and juridical status of the arrived migrants. Several security 
agents are present permanently, which often creates a tense atmosphere in the CIEs. These agents 
attempt to identify the migrants’ home country so they can be repatriated (Interview 2007). 
Several respondents said that migrants are sometimes sent back when a country-specific accent is 
noticed. The authorities have 72 hours time to identify the migrants and eventually execute 
repatriation. They can hold the migrants in the CIE for a maximum period of forty days. After 
this period, the migrants are sent to the Spanish mainland with an expulsion order, which is 
widely ignored in that country. Lawyers and police officials make the decision where the 
migrants are sent to. The actual flying in of migrants to the mainland has a strong distributive 
character. The most important destinations are: Madrid, Barcelona and, to a lesser extent, Malaga, 
Valencia and Alicante. In these cities the Red Cross often takes care of the second stage of the 
‘reception’ process. Migrants are given food, clothes and shelter for the first days. From then on, 
many migrants find their way in (or out of) Spain on their own. Others are given a train ticket in 
order to enable them to reach social contacts or supportive (migrant) organizations (Interview 
2007).   
 
After their arrival on the Spanish mainland, migrants often contact relatives or acquaintances 
from their home country, sometimes with the help of the Red Cross. Migrants then obtain the 
most relevant information, preferably on accommodation and job opportunities, through social 
networks (Interview 2007). Another way for migrants to receive relevant information is to get in 
contact with the migrant reception organizations or migrant self-organizations. In Spain we spoke 
to representatives of several Senegalese migrant organizations. One stated the following:  
 
”Many Senegalese migrants know already that our organization exists before arriving in Spain. 
Although it is officially not the aim of the organization, we are assisting more and more migrants 
that have just arrived. They just knock on our door, so what can we do? We try to get in contact 
with their family members, we provide information about the city, and sometimes we even 
arrange accommodation for the first period, but we cannot assist them for a long time.”    
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The potential role of migrant organizations in the migration process of others is confirmed by the 
findings of Ros et al. (2007). They state that migrant associations are potential agents in the 
decision making process towards emigration because: “They enjoy credibility and cultural 
proximity that official institutions may lack” (Ros et al. 2007). 
The mobility of migrants 
Once in Spain, migrants tend to be highly mobile within the Spanish state borders. A considerable 
number of people finds work in the direct (geographical) surroundings of their social contacts or 
temporal place of residence, but many others move to other regions in the country (Interview 
2007).  
Because the agricultural sector offers the best working opportunities, many migrants 
move (temporarily) to Andalusia where the sector is most extended. There, most harvests are only 
seasonal and migrants therefore often move synchronically with the harvests; which turns them 
into highly mobile actors. From February until June, they help out with picking strawberries in 
Huelva and from December until February with the olive harvest in Jaén, Cordoba, Granada, 
Malaga and Seville (see figure 2). In the province Almería the agriculture production is year 
round and migrants can live more structurally here (van Moppes and Schapendonk 2007).  
Besides this seasonal mobility in the more rural areas, migrants can also move between 
urban places. We asked one Senegalese respondent why he went to Granada and not to Barcelona 
or Madrid, he answered the following: 
 
”Well, for work. It is a lot easier in Granada to do this job [selling CDs as street vendor]. But I 
hope to go to Barcelona one day. I am from Dakar and I love the real city.” 
 
But Barcelona is not his final goal: 
 
“In the end I am hoping to reach Amsterdam, my sister is living there…If I had the money I 
would leave tomorrow!” 
 
Another Senegalese migrant in Granada was also thinking about Barcelona as the next step in his 
migration process, and after Barcelona he would like to go to Paris. A Congolese man living in 
Madrid told us that he assisted recently a compatriot, who had been in Spain irregularly for a few 
weeks, with his migration process to Basle. These examples indicate that the migration process 
within Spain and to other European countries can have a step-by-step character, comparable with 
the migration process in Africa. It also shows that, despite the popularity of Spain as a destination 
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country, it can also function as a transit country. This shows that transit migration does exist 
within the borders of Europe. Again, however, it is not a simple matter of passing through one 
country in order to reach another. As one Cameroonian migrant in Madrid explained:  
 
“Migration is not a fluent process. People move from place to place, if they do not find a job 
somewhere…they move again.” 
 
This quote indicates that migrants compare the current place they live in with possible other 
places to go to. This comparison is mainly based on job opportunities and social networks. The 
following fragment of an interview with an Anglophone African migrant (country unknown) 
symbolizes the comparative character of the migration process. On the question whether he would 
like to stay in Madrid he answered: 
 
“Well I don’t know. All I know is that I am here at the moment, where I will be tomorrow 
depends. If there is a better place to live or work in, somewhere, I will go there, of course. 
Migration is like that you know. You are just looking for a good place to live in.”  
 
It is often taken for granted that a large migrant community is an important pull factor for 
migrants when they are comparing different optional destinations. The reality is often more 
complex. In Catalonia, for instance, we found a more or less saturated community. Due to the 
high rent prices, the small houses the settled migrants live in and the increasing number of 
Senegalese people coming to the region, the Senegalese community is no longer able to 
accommodate all newly arrived migrants. The solidarity networks have not yet disappeared 
completely, but changed into a different form. Instead of providing accommodation and jobs, 
food and clothes are distributed among the ‘new people’ (Interview 2007). This saturation could 
stimulate or force migrants to look for other places to go to and creates possibly unwanted and 
unexpected forms of transit migration.  
 
By outlining the migration process within the EU, it is relevant to re-note the thin dividing line 
between transit migration and multiple or repeated migration. For a considerable number of 
migrants, settling in a desired destination does not mean they will not migrate again. As stated 
earlier, several evidence-based migration theories (cumulative causation, culture of migration) 
proves that “once someone migrates, the more he or she is likely to continue migrating” (Düvell 
2006; DaVanzo and Morrison 1982). We found the example of a Senegalese woman who had 
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lived for twelve years in Italy and recently migrated to Spain, while many Senegalese people also 
migrate in the opposite direction. In line with this, she stated that Senegalese people move 
regularly between Milan and Barcelona, since many Senegalese are living in both cities. A lot of 
people ‘commutes’ between these cities. Another interesting example of African mobility within 
Europe is the presence of three Ghanaian men in the coast town of Roquetas del Mar (Spain). All 
three lived in Amsterdam for more than five years, but recently migrated to the South of Spain. 
One migrated with his family; the others were working only temporarily in Spain and their 
families were still in Amsterdam. In this perspective, one can say that African people are or can 
be very mobile within the borders of the EU. They move far more easily from one EU country to 
another because they are not attached to national identities of European countries and feel hardly 
any boundaries. Furthermore, as some authors argue, migrants’ irregular status make them, in 
many cases, also more flexible than indigenous workers (Jordan and Düvell 2002). Thus Africans 
and also other non-EU migrants seem to be more flexible in fulfilling the EU’s labor needs. This 
is striking since the EU is attempting to mobilize and ‘flexibilize’ its labor because the intra-
regional mobility is relatively low, or even negligible (Fertig and Schmidt 2002; van Houtum and 
van der Velde 2004).  
Finally, the recent exodus of a large part of the Somali community from the Netherlands 
to the United Kingdom also shows that, even after a relatively long stay (more than five years) in 
one country, migrants can decide to migrate once again (or take the next step in their migration 
process). A recent study in the Netherlands shows that these Somali migrants went to the United 
Kingdom due to a multiple set of factors. The most important were the restrictive social-
economic environment and the lack of perspective regarding cultural and religious participation 
in The Netherlands (van den Reek and Hussein 2003). A same trend is noticed in Denmark where 
also a considerable number of Somali people went to the UK after having gained Danish, and 
thus EU, citizenship (Bang Nielsen 2004). 
 
 3. Transit migration: Spontaneous movements and their restrictions 
As the above analysis show, transit migrants often use hybrid networks and create collectives in 
order to fulfill their migration process towards Europe. Once in Europe most of these migrants 
depend predominantly on their social networks, migrant communities and institutions active in 
the reception of migrants. However, this does not automatically undermine migrants’ flexibility. 
In most cases migrants decide actively, when, where and how to go somewhere. They react on 
newly received information and, moreover, migrants are often not restricted by the presence of 
family members and feel little responsibility towards their (temporary) employers. This makes 
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them relatively ‘footloose’. In addition, migrants may reshape their original plans over time; 
sometimes migrants decide to settle in perceived transit areas and sometimes they move away 
from desired destinations as in the case of saturated migrant communities and disappointing job 
opportunities.  
As we have seen, the solidarity between migrants often ends where a migration opportunity for an 
individual begins, at least in the final stage before reaching Europe. In other words, migrants 
create collectives as a survival strategy but are flexible in fulfilling their individual aims. As one 
migrant expert in Dakar stated: “Many migrants have their personal behavior and common or 
collective behavior” (Interview 2007).  
 
A consequence of migrants’ flexibility is the unforeseeable character of their movements. As 
Collyer writes: “There is no linear logic to their movements. Rather they should be understood as 
spontaneous circulations that have developed in response to new information and new 
opportunities within the migrants’ social networks” (Collyer 2006). We spoke to a Togolese 
migrant, who traveled through six countries in order to reach Morocco, and from there he was 
hoping to reach Europe. Once he arrived in Morocco, he heard that it was almost impossible to 
fulfill his plans from there, so he decided to go to Dakar where he lived for several months now. 
In Dakar he talked about his plan to go to Lagos (Nigeria), the next stage of his migration 
process.  
Besides migrants’ own decisions, interventions of the authorities may also contribute to 
the ‘illogical’ movements of transit migrants. One Ghanaian respondent told us that the Moroccan 
police had already deported him eight times, and each time he went back to the same place he got 
deported from. Several representatives of Spanish NGOs illustrated also that many migrants, who 
got repatriated from the Canary Islands try to reach Europe again, in different or similar ways.  
 Another explanatory factor of the flexible and non-linear routes is the lacking 
geographical knowledge of many migrants (“some people think that the Canary Islands are 
around the corner”) and the role of social networks (“geographically Africans do not always 
know were they are going, but they do know where their networks are”).7  
Altogether, this assumes that, although several researchers have identified the most 
important (linear) migration routes for African migrants to go to Europe (Nyberg Sørensen 2006; 
de Haas 2007; van Moppes 2006), these routes are much more changeable and less straight from 
a micro perspective. To summarize in the words of John K. Hoppe (in van Houtum and van 
Naerssen 2002): “Sometimes the zigzag route is the straightest.”  
 
 22 
In the framework of migrants’ spontaneous movements it is important to note that the departure 
areas for the final jump to Europe change dramatically in a relatively short period of time. As 
showed in figure 3 the EU has extended its border protection to the coast of Senegal. Although 
the ‘border protection’ (the protection activities are geographically distant from the European 
border) does not yet fully cover this area, like the Moroccan and the Mauritanian coast line, the 
Spanish and Senegalese authorities carry out intensive surveillances. As a result, the migration 
departure areas have shifted more southwards to the coastline of The Gambia and Guinea 
Conakry (Carling 2007; Kohnert 2007). This implies that, besides the individual migrant, 
migration networks and migration systems and their actors are very flexible as well. They react 
continuously and effectively on (restrictive) policy initiatives from the North. For this reason, 
researchers have argued against the success of the European border control. Carling, for example, 
clearly outlines the limitations of the Spanish high-tech border control system ‘Sistema Integrado 
de Vigilancia Exterior’ (SIVE)(Carling 2007). Even if SIVE excels in detecting and apprehending 
unauthorized boat migrants, it is merely one link in “the migration control chain.” He emphasizes 
the fact that apprehended migrants must be processed on a case-by-case basis (Carling 2007). 
Furthermore, as stated earlier, the majority of irregular migrants enters Spain completely ‘legal’ 
and become ‘illegal’ overtime; others enter Spain ‘illegally’ but become ‘legal’ citizens after 
regularization rounds. This proves that migrants’ irregular status is relative and changeable 
(Jordan and Düvell 2002).   
 
The fact that transit migrants are highly flexible and move spontaneously does not mean that they 
are completely independent. Firstly, they depend heavily on their social networks to obtain 
reliable information and, in some cases, money. Moreover, as stated above, the restrictive 
migration policies constrain migrants in their movement. A considerable group of people end up 
involuntary ‘stranded’ in perceived transit areas, notably in North Africa. Others are apprehended 
and put in detention centers. These restrictive migration policies force migrants to use irregular 
migration means and make them (partly) dependent on smugglers and other ‘third persons’. These 
migrant facilitators are also of vital importance for migrants since particular parts of their journey 
are extremely difficult to cross. All these factors undermine migrants’ independency. 
One factor of dependency that is not yet discussed extensively is money. When migrants 
do not have the financial means to pay migration facilitators they are likely to be immobile. 
Money is a key factor in migration, as one Cameroonian migrant in Madrid commented on his 
journey through Africa:  
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“It is definitely not easy, you can’t imagine; every day is a survival. The only thing that matters is 
money, for food in the first place and of course for continuing the journey… It is all about what 
you have in your pocket.” 
 
In this perspective, it is important to note that there is growing awareness that migrants are not the 
poorest people of a specific country (Skeldon 1997; de Haas 2007). Migration is, in most cases, 
an expensive undertaking; in case of maritime voyages to Spain (departing from Senegal or 
Morocco) migrants have paid prices between $800 and $1900 (van Moppes and Schapendonk 
2007). In comparison; a regular flight from Dakar to Madrid ranges from $570 to $1100.  
 
4. Conclusion 
For sub-Saharan African migrants heading for Europe their migration process is highly dynamic. 
Perceived transit areas may turn into (in)voluntary destinations since some migrants decide to 
settle in places as a second best option and others are forced to stay and are ‘waiting’ for a 
considerable period of time for their opportunity to make the next step of their journey. The other 
way around one can say that migration projects and migration processes do not automatically end 
when someone is living for some years in a specific place or when a desired destination is 
reached. For many (transit) migrants, migration consists of repeated moves and temporal 
settlements; their plans and aspirations as well as their migration opportunities are rather variable 
than fixed. In this framework I plead for a more dynamic understanding of migration. In my view, 
sub-Saharan African migration towards Europe should be understood in terms of mobility (and its 
restrictions) rather than in terms of a permanent or semi-permanent change of location. In this 
context I would like to finish with the words of Skeldon who states the following on migration: 
 
“Migration, or more exactly mobility…technically, does not become ‘permanent’ until an 









Figure 1: Migrants’ settlements 
 
Legenda: 
    
  = Places of ‘refoulement’  
 
  = Detention centers in Spanish Enclaves 
 
  = Informal camps 
 
  = Formal detention centers in Spain 
 
  = Informal settlements in greater cities 
 
(Oujda = informal camp 5) 
 









Figure 3: The EU’s border protection zone 
 
Source: BBC news: news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/5331896.stm (news message from: 10-
10-2006) 




                                                                                                                                                 
Notes 
1Here it has to be said that all three studies take into account the act of smuggling in their analysis. 
Therefore, it would be unjust to suggest that these studies do not include the facilitation of migration. 
However, I attempt to be more extended on this issue by distinguishing several facilitating actors in the 
migration process.    
2 I conducted fieldwork together with David van Moppes and I would like to thank him for his insights, 
efforts and company.  
3 Migration hubs are here defined as important places en route where migrants are gathering, working 
and/or preparing their next step of their journey. 
4 See also Nyberg Sørensen (2006) and Carling (2007). 
5 In Niger the term ghetto is used to describe the areas in which foreign migrants are accommodated 
separated by nationality. 
6 Piso Patera literally means “Patera Floor” referring that these people are living together as neighbors of a 
same floor of an apartment. 
7 Quotes from an interview with a migration scholar in Dakar (Senegal). 
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